I doubt this would be done just for Whonix devs/users. This would somehow have to benefit everyone.
Most requests are denied because they somehow degrade anonymity for everyone. Since they hardcoded these prefs(?) they don’t want Tor Browser users changing them around. Maybe the best approach is to upfront with them on the reason for doing this. Take Whonix out of the equation. While non for anonymity make sure they know Whonix devs have already completed a lot of work on this.
Would be useful to everyone (everyone needs an security focused clearnet browser)
I have a new branding idea. Currently there is SecBrowser, Hardended Debian based OS and maybe more apps hardened by Whonix developers. We could use “Sec” as the brand for the OS and apps that are hardened. For example:
Configuring lock_pref() , lockPref()might be a workaround for these two issues. I think thats’ what TBB devs use to keep users from changing prefs such as the security slider default. it will likely break Tor Browser but cant hurt to try.
Yes. We need to ask for how to set the pref. We can say that we know
there will be no environment variable and have to go the profile route.
It could be in form of a bug report “setting this pref does not work as
expected” or as enhancement request “please document how to do…” or it
could be asked on the mailing list as a question. Dunno what’s best but
anything can work, I guess.
I was using either to many user_prefs (
extensions.torbutton.security_custom) or they were in the wrong order when setting the security slider, which was breaking SecBrowser.
It looked sane but I should have added one at a time.
It might set the slider to highest but does it also do the action that
slider would apply when it is manually being set to highest? I.e. would
it actually disable scripts globally when started in this configuration?