Do bridges inside a Whonix-Gateway reduce the capacity of an adversary to do correlation attacks?

[cryptid]

I understand that there are no ways to truly hide the connection to the tor network, but are bridges even useful?

[Patrick]

I haven’t seen any Tor security research papers making that argument.

In active end-to-end correlation attacks by a global adversary, traffic, timing is measures and manipulated at both ends. The crude way to imagine this (which is not how it needs to be done) is to completely block all internet connections at one or multiple user’s side and then looking at remote server side if the download/communication stops. If so, then that’s a confirmation.

So no, I don’t think bridges help here.

See:
Configure (Private) (Obfuscated) Tor Bridges chapter Intended User Groups in Whonix wiki

My answer here also applies:

Do obfs4 bridges impact stream isolation?

Does using bridges to connect to the gateway impact anonymity and stream isolation of multiple tor clients running simultaneously from the gateway?

Unspecific to Whonix.

Potential Solutions Beyond Whonix!