Traffic correlation using netflows

I’m using VPN > Whonix Gateway > VPN connection. I need exit VPN connection in my country. My /usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf config - (StrictNodes 1 ExcludeNodes { my country code }). Additionally, I’m using Noisy (github /1tayH/noisy) on Workstation. If government in my country will have access to exit VPN сan they use traffic correlation using netflows attack for de-anonymize me? (blog torproject /traffic-correlation-using-netflows)

Control over the Entry (ISP) + Exit (VPN in your case) is certainly risky for users.

This might just make you even easier to fingerprint.

That first VPN is especially useless at best and a waste of bandwidth and performance handicap.

No. You really shouldn;t mess with Tor’s path selection, you will harm your anonymity.

Another useless measure that wastes resources. Creating chaff to hide the wheat is a more complex problem then simplycontinuously generating bogus traffic. Website fingerprinting would make it trivial to figure out that the requested data is the same fake request. Recent padding implementation in Tor intelligently sends padded cells in just the right amount to obscure traffic from malicious Tor nodes while not wasting bandwidth. Noisy is redundant at best.

If Tor is not broken then no. Most likely they will track you down thru your payment info.

Is a known problem with known solutions that are being implemented at the moment.

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