Qubes-Whonix 14 timesync vs usabilty decision

Information

ID: 658
PHID: PHID-TASK-y6rvemug5ajhjxdlc3wb
Author: Patrick
Status at Migration Time: invalid
Priority at Migration Time: Normal

Description

#Whonix_14 will come with major time related deanonymization attack defenses. The only networking allowed is Tor and sdwdate until sdwdate succeeded, i.e. until the clock is unlinked from all other VMs. (T533)

On the Qubes-Whonix side this does not work well yet #usability wise.

The real solution would be T534, but that is hard to implement. Needs tons of time that I currently do not have. I doubt I can implement it in time for #Whonix_14.

Options are:

    1. disable this new feature in Qubes-Whonix [1]
    1. leave it enabled, but then users would have really bad usability [2]
    1. somehow magically find a contributor who implements T534 [3]

Which option do you suggest? @marmarek


[1] Enabling / disabling this feature is as simple as an /etc/whonix_firewall.d/ config snippet drop-in.
[2] Tor Browser might already be started, but with broken connectivity, since time synchronization is not done yet. And if time synchronization was to fail, then this issue would not be communicated to the user.
[3] I could ask iry to work on the gui part, but at the moment iry has its hands full with anon-connection-wizard.

Comments


marmarek

2017-04-13 12:53:33 UTC


Patrick

2017-04-13 13:42:36 UTC


marmarek

2017-04-13 13:57:40 UTC


Patrick

2017-04-13 17:39:21 UTC


marmarek

2017-04-14 18:09:03 UTC


anonymous1

2017-04-16 12:09:05 UTC


Patrick

2017-04-16 16:26:03 UTC


anonymous1

2017-04-16 17:32:34 UTC


Patrick

2017-04-27 18:04:22 UTC


anonymous1

2017-05-03 01:19:46 UTC


Patrick

2017-07-23 16:03:33 UTC


Patrick

2017-12-02 19:26:35 UTC