Thanks tempest.
How about (new changes):
- Unified KVM tar.gz Whonix downloads
& Unified Virtualbox OVA Whonix downloads
- Whonix Warrant Canary
https://whonix.org/Trust#Whonix_Warrant_Canary
- New Forum Code of Conduct
https://whonix.org/Forum_Best_Practices#Code_of_Conduct
- Qubes R3.2 reaches EOL
{{mbox
| image = [[File:Ambox_warning_pn.svg.png|40px]]
| text = Qubes R3.2 reached [Qubes OS 3.2 has reached EOL | Qubes OS EOL] on 28 March, 2019. It is strongly recommended to [Download Qubes OS | Qubes OS upgrade to Qubes R4.0] to stay safe.
}}
So to clarify (resolve the impasse), how about we add (you can add your math skills to calculate actual % if you like as an example):
Some users question why a different Tor guard is not configured for each identity within a specfic domain of activity, such as email accounts ‘Jane Doe’ and ‘John Doe’. Mathematically speaking, each “roll of the dice” (new Tor entry guard selection) increases the probability that a malicious, adversary-controlled guard is selected. Therefore, it is objectively safer to use one guard with different workstations for each identity, even though this comes with the (low) risk that a compromised guard is chosen for select activities and accounts.
Can we approve that Anon Connection Wizard edit on that page too please (still points to old software).