preventing Qubes-Whonix updates through clearnet on Qubes R4 / ensuring torified updates

root issue:

impact:

Users who clone whonix-gw or whonix-ws, will quite likely either not know they have to edit /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.UpdateProxy or forget about it.

workaround:

I am not sure what @marmarek will decide wrt UpdateVM for templates always defaults to sys-net · Issue #3118 · QubesOS/qubes-issues · GitHub and when the solution flows into Qubes.

Meanwhile I would like to add a workaround. Please check the implementation.

Latest /etc/uwt.d/40_qubes.conf (just small changes, refactoring, output).

qubes-whonix/40_qubes.conf at master · Whonix/qubes-whonix · GitHub

A safer workaround would be a Qubes-Whonix TemplateVM firewall that block access to Qubes updates proxy.

(qubes-whonix/torified-updates-proxy-check at master · Whonix/qubes-whonix · GitHub would have to run under a special user that may circumvent the firewall.)

All of this is done. Qubes TemplateVMs whonix-gw and whonix-ws will now use Whonix-Workstation firewall. (whonix-gw template will use it as well since the whonix-gw template is “actually more like a workstation”)

whonix-gw-firewall / whonix-ws-firewall package got merged into a single package whonix-friewall. Tons of commits.

So now even if UpdateVM for templates always defaults to sys-net · Issue #3118 · QubesOS/qubes-issues · GitHub does not get implemented or not so soon, it got much harder to update over clearnet. It is still possible to update over clearnet with manual reconfiguration, and good that this flexibility and freedom exists.

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