i was thinking last night of a theoretical protection against the ISP sniffing or reduce the attacker threat to my connection. so i have an idea but i dont know if its going to work , but here it is:-
if we can have more than one Tor connection on a different VMs inside Qubes let say five , which r all opened together at the same time or gradually and including my connection among one of them. in another word:-
1- Tor VM (not mine)
2- Tor VM (not mine)
3- Tor VM (my connection)
4- Tor VM (not mine)
5- Tor VM (not mine)
wouldnt that increase our anonymity by increasing the surface of connectors points to Tor? (which for sure one of these connections r my real connection but i dont have one connection only , instead i have five and im only using one).
to make this more efficient to use theory:-
1- the manipulated virtualmachines are not in a true storage , but it only need a fixed storage which mean we need only disposable non-persistent storage (amnesic).
2- these manipulated virtualmachines WONT be useable by human. they are there just for the sake of its purpose. which will give us the opportunity to put these virtualmachines in the lowest consuming resources (RAM , Processor …etc) so no files or media players or …etc (so even low storage).
3- to harden these virtualmachines we can make the design of whonix (mini-whonixes) to be used from these VMs:-
Note:- we can use this design in case that just opening Tor wont manipulate anything , but if we open Tor + TBB and surfing X or Y website then we will have this method/theory to work.
(X , Y , Z ,V = just random websites.)
1- GW (Tor) - WS (TBB + X website) (disposable VM)
2- GW (Tor) - WS (TBB + Y website) (disposable VM)
3- GW (Tor) - WS (TBB + my surfing) (normal VM)
4- GW (Tor) - WS (TBB + Z website) (disposable VM)
5- GW (Tor) - WS (TBB + V website) (disposable VM)
…etc from hardening things we can put inside this theory. but i dont know if its going to be effective or not , and what will the ISP see when we apply this.