Potential improvements for Virtual Machine Cloaking - KVM

[Patrick]

@7up

I don’t want to change any of the default configuration files. This is a suggestion for a separate config with extra changes that improve anonymity at the expense of usability. Do you not understand what I’m suggesting?

We might be able to change the default configuration files but maintaining a different set of configuration files is unfortunately unrealistic due to lack of KVM contributor activity.

@7up

@Patrick

cpumodel qemu64 blocker, security issue:

@7up

Additionally, ensure that necessary features to protect against Spectre, Meltdown, and other attacks are enabled.

@7up

<cpu mode="custom" match="exact" check="none">
  <model fallback="forbid">qemu64</model>
  <feature policy="require" name="ibpb"/>
  <feature policy="require" name="md-clear"/>
  <feature policy="require" name="spec-ctrl"/>
  <feature policy="require" name="ssbd"/>
</cpu>

This should be sufficient on Intel processors to protect against Spectre and Meltdown attacks.

Since nobody else on the internet claims to do that, and this being highly complex question with security impact…

TODO: Contact Qemu-discuss Info Page and ask if this is secure or vulnerable to any CPU hardware security bugs.

@7up

You can verify the security of your system by running the following command: sudo spectre-meltdown-checker

Unfortunately, this tool is not reliable (at least not inside VMs) due to false-positives, false-negatives and the complexity of CPU hardware security bugs. Hence, the only way to find that out is to contact upstream, the QEMU developers.