This isn’t a problem for my specific usecase. Thanks for mentioning this issue.
The use of Onionbalance protects the onion service key by pointing to a different service descriptor (server).
When the attacker hacks the server, it is not the same key as the master key hosted by the Onionbalance instance, correct?
What about using OpenVPN and Wireguard or Lokinet as I mentioned earlier. I have done some speed tests and Lokinet can handle the required load.
Tor competitors - Orchid Protocol, Mainframe, Obsidian, Skrumble, Dusk, Marconi, Loki, Nym
No further comments available.
On the same page as TLS unfortunately hence why VPNs are not tools for anonymity, but limited privacy depending on the threat model.
Have heard it being mentioned in the past, but haven’t read any whitepapers, spec docs or peer reviewed research from the anonymity and privacy research community to make a judgement. Consider using a 1 hop onion service as a second connection between WS And backend.
Tor is not fast enough. Using a single hop onion service is a good idea to reduce latency. Unfortunately, this does not increase throughput.
What about Shadowsocks? I’ve heard that you can use this software to bypass the Chinese firewall (I suspect it does some padding to sneak through DPI).
Opinions on this topic?
Is Shadowsocks a valid option?
Also: Is my understanding about Onionbalance correct?
onionbalance: As said, I didn’t look into it. https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Free_Support_Principle applies.
Shadowsocks: Same. See also Non-bridge Censorship Circumvention Tools.
Would Onionbalance be a software worth writing documentation for?