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Long Wiki Edits Thread


#161

I think this is a result of lack of communication.

Whenever I make a major edit or create a new page I discuss it with Patrick first to see the best place and presentation for the material so I don’t get disappointed. There’s nothing wrong with that and it works out. Many of my first edits were flat out rejected but I learned the best way to do things and stuck around. I’m happy I did and I hope you do too.

Bad example. Spender is a greedy asshole with a god-complex who is making money off other people’s contributions - not really a good example for anyone to copy.


#162

Right, sorry I spat the dummy there a bit.

To resolve it, how about creating a new page: “Tor Browser (Advanced Users)” or similar.

Then, the following sections would go in there (cut and pasted from already edited versions), along with the detailed design crap around Torbutton functions. “Advanced:” part could be removed from the title headings too ->

1) Proposed Tor Browser (Advanced Users) page

Tor Browser Adversary Model

Adversary Goals
Adversary Positioning Capabilities
Adversary Attack Capabilities

Torbutton

Torbutton Design
Torbutton Functions
    New Identity Function
    New Tor Circuit

Sandboxed Tor Browser

Introduction
Sandboxing Effects on Tor Browser Functionality
Sandboxing Tor Browser in Non-Qubes-Whonix
    Tor Browser Sandbox Dependencies
    Download Tor Browser Sandbox
    Launch Sandboxed Tor Browser
Sandboxing Tor Browser in Qubes-Whonix

Custom Homepage

Custom Configurations

Verify New Identity
Get a New Identity without Tor ControlPort Access

Proxy Settings

Remove Proxy Settings
Change Proxy Settings

tor-launcher vs torbrowser-launcher

tor-launcher
torbrowser-launcher

Platform-specific Issues

Qubes-Whonix
    Running Tor Browser in Qubes TemplateVM
    tb-updater in Qubes TemplateVM
Whonix-Custom-Linux-Workstation
Windows

Debugging
Footnotes
License

2) The main Tor Browser page is then left with the (recently re-organized) Table of Contents like so ->

Introduction
Anonymity vs Pseudonymity

Encryption

HTTPS Encryption
    HTTPS Advantages
    HTTP / HTTPS Connections with and without Tor
Onion Services Encryption
    Onion Services Advantages
    How Onion Services Connections Work

Tor Browser Add-Ons

HTTPS Everywhere
NoScript
    Security vs Usability Trade-off
Non-default Add-ons
    Non-default Add-on Risks

Torbutton (simplified, with design features detail removed)

Torbutton Functions
    New Identity Function
    New Tor Circuit
    Security Slider
    Check for Tor Browser Update
    Disabled Torbutton Functions

Tor Browser: How-To

Start Tor Browser
    From the Menu
    From the Command Line
    Successful Tor Browser Connection
File Downloads
    Warnings
    Navigating Tor Browser Downloads
Browser Language
Local Connections
    Configuring an Exception
    Local Connections Exception Threat Analysis
Harden Tor Browser
    Tor Browser Series and Settings
    Multiple Tor Browser Instances and Whonix-Workstations
    Sandboxing and DisposableVMs
    AppArmor Confinement

Update Tor Browser

Tor Browser Downloader by Whonix
    Installation Process
    Download Confirmation Notification
    Installation Confirmation Notification
Tor Browser Internal Updater
Tor Browser Manual Update

Unsafe Tor Browser Habits
Whonix Tor Browser Differences
Glossary and Key Terminology

Glossary
Key Terminology

Footnotes / References
License

3) Compare 1 & 2 to the current (old) approved Tor Browser entry ->

Introduction
Anonymity vs Pseudonymity
HTTPS Encryption
HTTPS Everywhere
Torbutton
New Identity Button
Protection against dangerous JavaScript
NoScript
Tips

Maximizing Browser Window

Tor Browser in Whonix differences

Introduction
Whonix Proxy Settings
More than one Tor Browser in Whonix

Update Tor Browser

Introduction
Updating
    Tor Browser Downloader by Whonix
        Introduction
        Download Confirmation Screen
        Installation Confirmation Screen
    Tor Browser Manual Update
    Tor Browser Internal Updater

Start Tor Browser
File Downloads
Not installed by Default
Local Connections
Browser Plugins / Flash / Java
Browser Language
AppArmor Confinement
Advanced Topics

Tor Browser Hardened
Tor Browser Sandboxed
    Introduction
    Sandboxing Effects on Tor Browser Functionality
    Sandboxing Tor Browser in Non-Qubes-Whonix
        Tor Browser Sandbox Dependencies
        Download the Tor Browser Sandbox
        Launching sandboxed-tor-browser
    Sandboxing Tor Browser in Qubes-Whonix
Custom Homepage
Unsupported Tor Browser Features in Whonix
    Tor Circuit View
    Misc
Verify New Identity
Get New Identity without Tor ControlPort Access
Remove Proxy Settings
Change Proxy Settings
Local Connections Exception Threat Analysis
tor-launcher vs torbrowser-launcher
tor-launcher
torbrowser-launcher
Terminology
    Tor vs Tor Browser
    Tor Browser Transparent Proxying
Qubes specific
    Running Tor Browser in Qubes TemplateVM
    tb-updater in Qubes TemplateVM
Whonix-Custom-Linux-Workstation specific
Windows specific
Start from Command Line
Debugging

Footnotes / References
License

Where does an “Advanced” page get created if this goes ahead. /Dev or elsewhere?


#163

Re: Libre Hardware section in Computer Security Education (marked as TO DO expand).

If you read a bunch of references e.g.

[https://www.wired.com/2015/03/richard-stallman-how-to-make-hardware-designs-free/]

[https://www.wired.com/2015/03/need-free-digital-hardware-designs/]

[https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/state_harmful.pdf]

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novena_(computing_platform)]

[http://www.pcworld.com/article/2046232/top-opensource-pcs.html]

[https://www.linux.com/news/take-control-open-source-hardware]

[https://www.linuxjournal.com/content/purism-librem-15-review]

[https://www.fsf.org/resources/hw]

[https://h-node.org/]

[https://www.coreboot.org/Supported_Motherboards]

[https://www.fsf.org/resources/hw/single-board-computers]

You basically discover there is no such thing as truly open hardware right now.

Since open source RISC processors supporting a fully-fledged operating system don’t yet exist, the closest thing available is Single-board computers (SBCs) which are computers delivered as one circuit board that are powerful enough to run a real operating system. They generally contain a System-on-a-Chip (SoC) with an ARM processor. This then:

  • Limits you to things like Novena, PandaBoardES (but still has closed-sourced binary blobs). FSF also notes severe flaws in these designs re: proprietary concerns
  • Rules out Purism laptop, since it uses an Intel CPU
  • Rutkowska notes even if you can run Coreboot/Libreboot with Intel CPUs this means jack shit, since the FSP can potentially malicously modify things, plus you’re still stuck with Intel ME (unless squashed with a python script - how many users will do that?)
  • Rutkowska also notes that ARM processors are really releases designed to a set of specs and othe IP, which is then licensed by various vendors. Also notes potential limitations eg availability of IOMMU and so on.
  • ARM also comes with so-called TrustZone mechanisms.

Basically, based on all the limitations of open source hardware currently, and the fact it is a partial solution that just leaves users with over-priced snake oil and/or not very powerful desktops/laptops, I don’t think it can be recommended in the docs.

Users are better off using modern hardware, taking their chances and waiting ten years until the open-source industry matures.

So, that’s what I’ll be writing there and leave it up to the reader to research the many hardware “solutions” themselves if Richard Stallman is their brother from another mother.


#164

If there are no objections, I’ll create a new page called Tor Browser: Advanced Users today.

The edits are hanging around like a dump that won’t flush, and it’s annoying from an editor’s perspective. Plus, Tor Browser questions coming up in forums (like today for example), could have just been referred to the updated wiki.

Note how all the bridges questions have dropped off to zero since that was edited for clarity? All of this saves work in the long run.


#165

torjunkie:

If there are no objections, I’ll create a new page called Tor
Browser: Advanced Users today.

Yes, please. Page name:

https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tor_Browser/Advanced_Users

This is because colons and spaces look ugly when the URL gets pasted.

The edits are hanging around like a dump that won’t flush, and it’s
annoying from an editor’s perspective. Plus, Tor Browser questions
coming up in forums (like today for example), could have just been
referred to the updated wiki.

Please fix/shrink that page please, i.e. move the new more detailed
stuff to https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tor_Browser/Advanced_Users.

Note how all the bridges questions have dropped off to zero since
that was edited for clarity? All of this saves work in the long run.

True, that’s awesome!


#166

Although the term adversary is not defined by The Tor Project,

Please remove that chapter from https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tor_Browser. Slippery legal territory when words get twisted under hostile interpretation. Not worth getting into.


#167

OK. That’s done.

  • Split Advanced Topics into Advanced page.
  • Put adversary stuff into Advanced page + removed inflammatory language about who adversaries probably are (to save us all a free, involuntary firmware upgrade) :wink:
  • Removed all technical stuff around Torbutton and specific functions into the Advanced section, while leaving basics in the main Tor Browser entry
  • Changed a million internal references to point to Advanced page where necessary (hopefully got them all). If not, easy to fix later.
  • Fixed a couple of typos and extra white spaces here and there.

Will return to Computer Security Education tomorrow. I reckon 2 or 3 days max and that will be done. Then I’ll edit the Advanced Security section (taking forever) before proposing here a full reworking of which sections go where from all the main security guides.

I’m thinking that at that point, it’s also worth putting the Security checklist (from the Security Guide) into a page of it’s own. So we end up with:

  • Computer Security Education (maybe renamed)
  • Security Guide
  • Advanced Security Guide
  • Security Checklist

All four would sit better in a section of their own on the main wiki Table of Contents page too IMO. But let’s worry about that later. Perhaps it could be entitled “Whonix and Security”.


#168

Moved How Onion Services Connections Work here:

https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Hidden_Services#How_Onion_Services_Connections_Work

Haven’t fully reviewed https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Template:Onion_Services_Technical yet. Are you sure onion services are using a distributed hash table (DHT)?


#169

Tor Browser page.

Security Slider

I don’t think Whonix should make any recommendations and stick with Tor Project recommendations.

Should we perhaps move Security Slider up?

Because chapter Security vs Usability Trade-off equally applies?


#170

There is a lot great new stuff on the Tor Browser page that was previously undocumented. It’s quite a lot stuff users have to know.


Wondering if Start Tor Browser chapter can be simplified a bit. To make the Tor Browser page shorter. From the Menu should be the main thing. Perhaps hide From the Command Line? Same for debugging start? The outer text should say “for start from command line or debug start, please press expand on the right”?


I think the following needs a revision.

‘’‘Do not Open Documents Downloaded via Tor while Online’’’

The Tor Project provides an explicit warning: https://www.torproject.org/download/download

Tor Browser will warn you before automatically opening documents that are handled by external applications. DO NOT IGNORE THIS WARNING. You should be very careful when downloading documents via Tor (especially DOC and PDF files, unless you use the PDF viewer that's built into Tor Browser) as these documents can contain Internet resources that will be downloaded outside of Tor by the application that opens them. This will reveal your non-Tor IP address. If you must work with DOC and/or PDF files, we strongly recommend either using a disconnected computer, downloading the free VirtualBox and using it with a virtual machine image with networking disabled, or using Tails. Under no circumstances is it safe to use BitTorrent and Tor together, however.

Do not Open Documents Downloaded via Tor while Online does not equally apply to Whonix. Either way, as a “feature” or otherwise, files such as pdf’s won’t be able to leak the user’s IP. An argument could be made that it’s better for privacy to open even non-malicious files (pdfs…) in offline VMs because then there won’t be any unwanted outgoing connections (bad for privacy and security). But the quote does not work for Whonix and needs a rewrite.


Do not Torrent over Tor is that related to Tor Browser? Perhaps when users install a torrent client in form of an add-on?

The Tor Project also warns against torrenting: https://www.torproject.org/download/download

Torrent file-sharing applications have been observed to ignore proxy settings and make direct connections even when they are told to use Tor. Even if your torrent application connects only through Tor, you will often send out your real IP address in the tracker GET request, because that's how torrents work. Not only do you deanonymize your torrent traffic and your other simultaneous Tor web traffic this way, you also slow down the entire Tor network for everyone else.

IP leaks does not apply to Whonix. See https://www.whonix.org/wiki/File_Sharing.


#171

Could you please move Local_Connections_Exception_Threat_Analysis to advanced as well?


#172

1) Security Slider

Right.

The Security Slider was positioned with Torbutton, since it seemed to be logical to put all those functions together e.g. New Identity, New Tor Circuit and so on.

Can move it though - no problem and remove any recommendation. Instead note something like:

“Users need to make a decision whether they prefer greater security and lower usability at higher levels, or vice-versa. While fingerprinting risks are greatly reduced at higher levels, some site functionality may also be lost.”

2) Start Tor Browser

Yes, the easiest solution is just to hide all the extra text with a “Expand on the Right” part.

3) Torrent over Tor & File Downloading

Yes, I was aware of the no IP leak in Whonix, but thought it best to encourage best practices.

Perhaps I’ll just note they are bad practices and paraphrase the quotes, while suggesting files be opened in offline VMs (which I think I mentioned elsewhere in the entry e.g. “Unsafe Tor Browser Actions” or similar.)

4) Local Connection

Yes, I’ll move that threat analysis to Advanced as well.

5) Onion Services

The DHT stuff was straight out of Tor docs, but I can double check.

Let me fix up 1-4, and double-check point 5 for accuracy. Shouldn’t take too long.


#173

1) DHT seems to be the case for .onion services, see:

https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en


So, I think the .onion services technical template is good for sign off. I added a link in Tor Browser entry to the relevant hidden services wiki entry.

2) Security Slider

On second thought, it’s too hard to move it around logically with current TOC. So I just entered this line at the bottom of security vs usability trade-off part:

“Note: The Torbutton extension’s [[#Security_Slider|Security Slider]] (see below) also involves a security versus usability trade-off. Users need to decide whether they prefer greater security and lower usability at higher slider levels, or vice-versa. While fingerprinting risks are greatly reduced at higher levels, some site functionality may also be lost.”

3) Collapsed Tor Browser Start stuff

Done.

4) Tor Browser Downloads

Done. Reworded.

"The Tor Project explicitly warns users not to open documents handled by external applications, since in the normal case they may contain Internet resources that may be downloaded outside of Tor by the application that opens them. https://www.torproject.org/download/download

This warning is not strictly relevant to Whonix users since all traffic is forced over the Whonix-Gateway and the IP address will not be leaked. Despite this fact, for greater safety users should open files such as PDFs and word processing documents in offline VMs.

Malicious files or links to files pose a greater threat; potential compromise of the user’s system. Therefore users should heed the Whonix advice to [[DoNot#Do_not_Open_Random_Files_or_Links|not open random links or files]] in the Whonix-Workstation. Instead, in [[Qubes-Whonix]] it is preferable to [https://micahflee.com/2016/07/how-qubes-makes-handling-pdfs-way-safer/ sanitize the PDF] or open the file or link in a [[Qubes/DisposableVM|DisposableVM]]. [[Non-Qubes-Whonix]] users should only open the file in a separate, offline Whonix-Workstation."

5) Local Connections Threat Analysis

Done. Moved to Advanced Section.

So, right now the Advanced Tor Browser entry is not signed-off, which means anybody trying to use that documentation today sees a blank page.

Probably best to sign-off ASAP.


#174

TODO -> TO DO this change may be grammatically more correct, but then one cannot search the wiki for TODO. Therefore please leave that unchanged.


#175

‘’‘2. Add jessie-backports to sources.list’’’

Do we have a template for that?


Since the move, Local Connections Exception Threat Analysis is now a case of lost me at hello. Could you please link back to the Tor Browser page for context or write an introduction to which situation it applies?


#176

A post was merged into an existing topic: Needed Wiki Templates


#177

OK.

  • Fixed all the “To do” back to TODO.
  • Also fixed a bunch of internal references that were pointing to the wrong (non-existent) entry after the split (missed them earlier).
  • Also changed some remaining ugly (long) internal references into nice wording instead.
  • I’ve fixed the threat analysis thing.

So Tor Browser is done! Great, thanks! :slight_smile:


#178

[[Tor_Browser/Internal_Updater#cite_note-64|this footnote]]

That won’t work for long. Could you add an anchor please?


#179

It worked on my preview test i.e. took me to the right footnote.

Please remind me about the Anchor formatting if you want me to change it anyway.


#180

Footnotes aren’t stable. As soon as another footnote is added above, the number will change.

Please remind me about the Anchor formatting if you want me to change it anyway.

{{Anchor|anchor_name}}

Then you can use pagename#anchor_name.