I think most people who start the DVM Template will run TorBrowser or a terminal, so it seems like a warning in those 2 locations would be seen.
Unless you separate out the user files from the application files of torbrowser, I think making it more “deb like” is a lost cause?
Is (2) customizing DVM templates really very geeky? Having lots of customized DVM templates is a natural consequence of Qubes 4.0’s new support for multiple DVM templates.
Outside of whonix, one might already have:
- DVM template with no network for opening PDFs
- another DVM template for clearnet web browsing with various adblockers preconfigured to block certain resources on certain sites
- another DVM template preconfigured with an IRC login, etc…
Even inside of Whonix, it’s natural to have multiple whonix DVM templates, corresponding to various tradeoffs between signature, speed, and security.
- factory DVM template
- DVM template whose torbrowser has addons to block 3rd party resources; to make it faster, at the expense of sticking out more. For non-security critical general browsing, where the adversary is merely advertising and tracking companies. DispVM enforces wiping history / cookies / browser state.
Even if a user only wants one whonix DVM template, they may find it surprising that their method of customizing non-whonix DVM templates doesn’t work in whonix.
And if they actually want multiple whonix DVM templates, it would be very easy to set up if DispVMs inherited their TorBrowser from the DVM template: open TorBrowser in each DVM Template and customize it. All done via GUI.
Edit: more cohesive.