That would be the first time we make changes to Tor Browser which are not related to integration into a Linux distribution (Whonix). Until now, no changes affected fingerprinting of default installation vs Tor Browser on Debian. Only environment variables were changed and add Tor Browser first startup popup to ask whether security slider should be set to safest drops (opt-in) a user.js file.
The higher Whonix’s popularity, the less fingerprinting arguments would make sense. If most Tor users were Whonix users, then Whonix could take the lead in fingerprint. For now, we’d stand out.
Already created consider using Hardened Malloc for better security in TBB (#31440) · Issues · Legacy / Trac · GitLab for it.
--disable-jmalloc
Speak: compile time option / require recompilation / build compiled by someone other than upstream?